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ABSTRACT
Bell’s Theorem depends on the assumption that hidden variables are not influenced
by future measurement settings, and it is widely recognised that some of the puzzling
features of quantum mechanics could be explained if this assumption were invalid.
The suggestion has generally been regarded as outlandish, however, even by the taxed
standards of the discipline. (Bell himself thought that it led to fatalism.) This paper
argues that there is surprisingly little justification for this reaction. Using an informal
model of the Bell correlations, the first part of the paper shows that the arguments
against advanced action in QM, where not simply invalid, are easily evaded on good
physical grounds. In the absence of such objections the approach has striking theoret-
ical advantages, especially in avoiding the apparent conflict between Bell’s Theorem
and special relativity.
The second part of the paper considers the broader question as to why advanced
action seems so counterintuitive, by investigating the origins of our ordinary intuitions
about causal asymmetry. It is argued that the view that the past does not depend
on the future is largely anthropocentric, a kind of projection of our own temporal
asymmetry. Many physicists have also reached this conclusion, but have thought that if
causation has no objective direction, there is no objective content to an advanced action
interpretation of QM. This turns out to be a mistake. From the ordinary subjective
perspective, we can distinguish two sorts of objective world: one “looks as if” it
contains only forward causation, whereas the other “looks as if” it involves a mix of
backward and forward causation. This clarifies the objective core of an advanced action
interpretation of QM, and shows that there is an independent symmetry argument in
favour of the approach.
1 An early version of this paper was read at the AAHPSSS Conference in Melbourne in
May, 1988. Many people have helped me with comments and discussion since then, and I am
especially indebted to Jeremy Butterfield, Peter Menzies and Jack Smart. I am also grateful
for research funding from the Australian Research Council.
The most profound conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics are those that
stem from the work of J. S. Bell in the mid-1960s.2As Bell’s Theorem became
well known, its author was often asked to survey the state of the subject, partic-
ularly in the light of his own contribution. He would typically conclude such a
lecture by listing what he saw as possible responses to the difficulties, indicating
in each case what he took to be the physical or philosophical objections to the
response concerned. His intuitions in this respect were somewhat unfashionably
realist—like Einstein, he disliked the common view that quantum mechanics
requires us to abandon the classical idea of a world existing independently of
our observations. He therefore appreciated the irony in the fact that from this
realist standpoint, his own work seemed to indicate that there are objective
non-local connections in the world, in violation of the spirit of Einstein’s theory
of special relativity. As he puts it in one such discussion,
the cheapest resolution is something like going back to relativity as it was
before Einstein, when people like Lorentz and Poincare´ thought that there
was an aether—a preferred frame of reference—but that our measuring
instruments were distorted by motion in such a way that we could not
detect motion through the aether. Now, in that way you can imagine
that there is a preferred frame of reference, and in this preferred frame of
reference things do go faster than light.3
Bell reached this conclusion with considerable regret, of course, and would of-
ten note that there is one way to save both locality and realism. Bell’s Theorem
requires the assumption that the properties of a system at a time are statisti-
cally independent of the nature of any measurements that may be made on that
system in the future—“hidden variables are independent of later measurement
settings”, to put it in the jargon. Bell saw that in principle one might defend
a local (and hence special relativity friendly) Einsteinian realism by giving up
this Independence Assumption. He found this solution even less attractive than
that of challenging special relativity, however, for he took it to entail that there
could be no free will. As he puts it, in the analysis leading to Bell’s Theorem
it is assumed that free will is genuine, and as a result of that one finds
that the intervention of the experimenter at one point has to have con-
sequences at a remote point, in a way that influences restricted by the
finite velocity of light would not permit. If the experimenter is not free to
make this intervention, if that also is determined in advance, the difficulty
disappears. (Davies and Brown, 1986, p. 47)
It is surprising that philosophers have not paid more attention to these re-
marks. In effect, Bell is telling us that Nature has offered us a metaphysical
2Bell (1964). Bell’s papers on the subject are collected in his (1987).
3In Davies and Brown (1986), pp. 48-9. The irony actually runs deeper than this, for Bell’s
Theorem seems to undercut Einstein’s strongest argument in favour of his view that there is
more to reality than quantum mechanics describes; more on this in section 1 below.
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choice of an almost Faustian character. We may choose to enjoy the meta-
physical good life in quantum mechanics, keeping locality, realism, and special
relativity—but only so long as we are prepared to surrender our belief in free
will! The philosophical interest of the case is hardly diminished by the fact that
Bell himself preferred to decline the temptation. It would be fascinating enough
if our philosophical engagement were merely that of spectators, an audience to
Bell’s Faust. As it is, of course, the same metaphysical offer is extended to all
of us, and many philosophers may feel that Bell was wrong to refuse. Some will
have long since concluded that there is no such thing as free will, and might
thus take the view that Nature is offering a very attractive free lunch. Others
have become adept at juggling free will (or some acceptable substitute) and
determinism, and hence might hope to take advantage of the offer at very little
real cost. (With respect, after all, who is Bell to tell us what is incompatible
with free will?) Even if Bell is right, and it does come down to a choice between
a relativistically acceptable realism and free will, we might feel that Bell simply
makes the wrong choice—what we should say, as honest empiricists, is simply
that science has revealed that we have no free will.
At any rate, one of my aims in this paper is simply to bring this engaging
issue to a wider philosophical audience. However, I also want to argue that the
offer is a much better one than Bell himself believed. I want to show that we
may help ourselves to the metaphysical advantages—locality and Einsteinian
realism—but save free will. Roughly speaking, the trick is to reinterpret the
same formal possibility in terms of backward causation. Instead of taking the
prior state of the physical system in question to “constrain” the experimenter’s
choice, we may reasonably take the latter’s choice to affect the prior state of the
physical system. The mathematics thus remains the same as in Bell’s proposal,
but we give it a different metaphysical gloss.4
The paper is in two main parts. The first part (sections 1-6) presents what
might be called the first-order case for the backward causation approach. In
4Strictly speaking there are two versions of Bell’s proposal. One way of relaxing the
Independence Assumption is to take the required correlation between hidden variables and
future measurement settings to be established by some common factor in their past. The
other is to take the correlation to be sui generis, obtaining simply in virtue of the interaction
between the system and measuring device in question. These two approaches agree on the
“core” mathematics involved—on the nature of the correlation between hidden states and
measurement settings—but disagree about the explanation of this correlation. It is the latter
strategy that I wish to defend here. As I note in Price (forthcoming), its advantages may
have been overlooked in part because it has not been clearly distinguished from the former
strategy, or because the former strategy has seemed more plausible, in not countenancing
backward causation. Bell seems to have been aware of both versions, and to have regarded
both as incompatible with free will, but it is doubtful whether he saw them as clearly distinct.
In my view the former strategy is objectionable on grounds that have nothing to do with
free will, namely that it calls for a vast and all-pervasive substructure in reality to provide
the required “common causes”. The latter view in contrast is elegant and economical, as
compatible as need be with free will, and appears to respect a temporal symmetry that other
views ignore.
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the interests of accessibility, I begin with a very informal account of Bell’s The-
orem, and the EPR experiment on which it is based. I use a fictional model to
illustrate the basic mathematical conflict between the kind of predictions made
by quantum mechanics and those that Bell showed to follow from the plausible
constraints of a local realism. Readers already familiar with the Bell’s Theorem-
by-parable approach will find nothing new here, and are encouraged to skim to
section 3, where I use the model to explain how the formal possibility that Bell
took to deny free will—the possibility that I recommend we interpret in terms
of backward causation—provides an elegant resolution of the conflict. Section 4
shows how it avoids traditional objections to backward causation, section 5 dis-
cusses Bell’s concerns about free will, and section 6 indicates how the informal
discussion of the preceding sections applies to the real world—i.e., to quantum
mechanics. The upshot seems to be that we may avail ourselves of Bell’s route
to a local realism about quantum mechanics, provided that we are prepared to
accept that quantum mechanics reveals the presence of backward causation in
the world.
At this point in the discussion what is striking is that despite its evident
advantages in quantum mechanics (and the weakness of the case against it), the
backward causation approach still seems rather unpalatable. The second part of
the paper attempts to diagnose and treat this aversion. Sections 7-13 develop a
kind of second-order case for the approach, intended to clarify its consequences
for physics and hence to show that it is very much more appealing than it seems
at first sight.
One motivation for this second project is that because the relationship be-
tween causation and physical theory is itself obscure and philosophically prob-
lematic, it is very far from obvious what the backward causation proposal actu-
ally amounts to, in physical terms. Of particular relevance here is the fact that
the temporal asymmetry of causation is itself rather puzzling, given the pre-
dominant symmetry of physical theory. As we shall see, this puzzle turns out to
provide a useful entry point into the tangle of issues that needs to be unravelled,
in order to clarify the physical content of the main proposal. In sections 7-9 I
defend the view that the asymmetry of physical dependency—roughly, the fact
that the future depends on the past but not vice versa—is anthropocentric in
origin, a kind of projection of own temporal asymmetry. An attractive feature
of this view is that it dissolves the apparent tension between the predominant
temporal symmetry of physics and the asymmetry of dependency: since the
latter isn’t objective, there is no conflict in re, as it were. The cure may seem
worse than the disease, however, and much of the work in this part of the paper
will be devoted to arguing that the view provides a sufficiently close approxi-
mation to objectivity to account for our intuitions concerning the direction of
dependency.
All the same, the view that the direction of causation is not genuinely objec-
tive may seem rather a mixed blessing for my main project. It might explain
our intuitive resistance to the idea of backward causation in quantum mechan-
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ics, but doesn’t it throw the baby out with the bath water? If the direction of
causation is not objective, what could be the physical content of the claim that
quantum mechanics should be interpreted as revealing that some causation is
“backward” rather than “forward”? Section 10 addresses this important objec-
tion, noting that the view that causal directedness is subjective leaves room for
two sorts of objective correlational structures in the world. From the anthro-
pocentric viewpoint one sort of structure looks causally “monotonic”, whereas
the other permits a mixed interpretation, so that the temporal perspective of
the interpreter imposes a dominant but not a universal causal orientation. This
will give us a useful characterisation of the objective core of what might more
accurately be called the advanced action interpretation. It simply amounts to
the suggestion that the correlational structure of the microworld is of the latter
(non-classical) kind.5 More surprisingly, we shall see in section 11 that this char-
acterisation suggests a powerful symmetry argument in favour of the advanced
action proposal—an argument which has been overlooked, I think, because it
has been obscured by the more familiar asymmetry of dependency (rightly be-
lieved not to conflict with physical symmetry principles). Thus we shall be led
to conclude that the advanced action approach is not only both physically and
metaphysically respectable, but seems to have a striking advantage, over and
above its application to quantum mechanics.
The paper also includes a brief account of an interesting new class of Bell-like
results in quantum mechanics, which appear to yield similar conclusions to Bell’s
Theorem by more direct means. I extend the parable of the earlier sections to
describe these results in informal terms, and to make the point that they do
nothing to weaken the case for advanced action in quantum mechanics—on the
contrary, if anything, since they simply add new weight to the metaphysical
burden from which advanced action promises to deliver us.
In case technically inclined readers should be disappointed, however, I want
to make it clear at the outset that I am not offering the formal details of an
interpretation or extension of quantum mechanics which embodies these ideas.
I shall explain in informal terms how there comes to be a formal possibility of
this kind—how it avoids the challenge to local realism posed by Bell’s Theorem.
But my main concern is to show that the strategy is very much more appealing
than Bell took it to be, and therefore worthy of a great deal more attention
from both physicists and philosophers than it has received so far.6 My thesis
is that an exceptionally promising route to a satisfying resolution of some of
5This enables us to clarify the assertion above that the backward causation interpretation
has the same objective core as Bell’s own “no free will” model: both amount to the suggestion
that quantum mechanics shows that what is in world is simply a particular pattern of corre-
lations (a pattern that classical physics really had no business to exclude a priori. Whether
we choose to interpret this pattern in terms of predetermination or backward causation thus
turns out to be in an important sense beside the point—the brute physical facts are the same
in either case.
6A few physicists have been more attracted to the advanced action approach than Bell
himself was. For references to some of their work, see the concluding footnote.
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the most profound puzzles in the history of science lies unexplored and almost
unnoticed. The aim of this paper is to try to clear away some of the conceptual
tangles that have obscured its promise for so long.
1. The man who proved Einstein was wrong?7
The most puzzling consequences of quantum mechanics arise in what are known
as the EPR experiments. The crucial feature of these cases is that they involve
a pair of particles, or physical systems, which interact and then move apart.
Providing the interaction is set up in the right way, quantum theory shows that
the results of measurements on one particle enable us to predict the results
of corresponding measurements on the other particle. For example we might
predict the result of measuring the position of particle 1 by measuring the
position of particle 2, or predict the result of measuring the momentum of
particle 1 by measuring the momentum of particle 2.
This was the feature that interested Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in the fa-
mous (1935) paper in which they first drew attention to these cases. The paper
sought to undermine what was already becoming the orthodox interpretation of
the fact that quantum theory shows that it is impossible to determine accurately
and simultaneously both the position and the momentum of a physical system.
The orthodoxy—the “Copenhagen Interpretation”, as it came to be called—was
that quantum systems do not have classical properties such as position and mo-
mentum, except when an appropriate measurement is made. Einstein wanted to
argue that the restriction on measurement was merely epistemological, however.
His motivation lay in his realism. He disliked the Copenhagen view that the
nature of reality could depend on what humans choose to observe, and believed
that the features of quantum mechanics that Bohr and others took as evidence
of deep entanglement between observation and reality were really a reflection of
the fact that the theory gives only a partial description of reality. As he saw,
the crucial question is therefore whether the quantum mechanical description
of reality can be considered to be complete. Does it say all there is to be said
about a physical system, or are there further facts about the physical world not
captured by quantum mechanics?
The two-particle systems seemed to provide the decisive argument that Ein-
stein was looking for. With Podolsky and Rosen, he argued that the existence
of such systems showed that quantum theory must indeed be incomplete. For
if we can predict either the measured position or the measured momentum of a
particle without interfering with it in any way, then it must have some property
responsible for the results of those measurements. If we measure the position
of particle 2 we infer that particle 1 has a definite position. If we measure the
7This description of Bell is due to Gribbin (1990). In this article—a tribute to Bell following
his death in October 1990—Gribbin gives a useful description of the EPR experiment and
Bell’s contribution, and also mentions some of Bell’s remarks on the possibility of abandoning
the Independence Assumption. For a comment taking issue with Gribbin’s characterisation
of Bell in these terms, see my (1991a).
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momentum of particle 2 we infer that particle 1 has a definite momentum. But
since in neither case do we do anything to particle 1 itself, it must have a def-
inite position and momentum, regardless of what we do to particle 2. In other
words it must have properties not described by quantum mechanics. Quantum
mechanics must be incomplete.
The EPR argument failed by and large to sway supporters of the Copenhagen
interpretation, but this is perhaps due more to the obscurity of the Copenhagen
response than to any compelling counter-argument it brought to light. With the
benefit of hindsight we would probably now say that Einstein was right, had Bell
not unearthed a remarkable sting in the tail of the EPR experiment. Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen had assumed that what we choose to measure on particle
2 could not have an effect on the distant particle 1. For example, measuring the
position of particle 2 could not somehow “bring it about” that particle 1 had
a definite position. In other words, the EPR argument for the incompleteness
of quantum mechanics assumes that physical effects are local—that there is no
action at a distance. The sting is that other features of the quantum mechanical
description of certain EPR cases seem to show that any more complete (“hid-
den variable”) theory would have to be non-local. It would have to reject the
very assumption on which the EPR argument depends. Einstein’s allies thus
find themselves in an unfortunate dilemma. To make a hidden variable theory
work—to make it consistent with quantum mechanics—they have to abandon
the assumption that enabled them to argue from the possibility of the EPR
experiment to the conclusion that there must be such a theory.8
The sting turns on the predictions that quantum theory makes about the
correlations between the results of the various possible measurements on the two
particles of certain EPR systems. It was the significance of these correlations
that was first noticed by Bell in the mid-1960s. Bell considered a variant of the
original EPR case (a version originally described by Bohm, (1951), pp. 614-19).
Fortunately for lay readers, we don’t need to know the details of Bohm’s case or
Bell’s Theorem to appreciate its puzzling character. The essential features can
be described in terms of an informal and much more commonplace analogue.
As we shall see, very little mathematical thought is required to show that if
analogous correlations were to arise in familiar regions of the world, they would
strike us as very odd indeed.9
8It is important to appreciate that this does not show that Einstein was wrong: it simply
saves his opponents from what would otherwise be a very serious objection. A common
misconception is that Bell’s argument excludes hidden variable (HV) theories tout court. It
does not. Even leaving aside the loophole discussed in the present paper, Bell’s result counts
only against local HV views, leaving open the possibility of non-local HV theory—while non-
locality itself can hardly be held to be a decisive failing in HV views if other views need it as
well, as Bell’s result suggests that they do.
9I have adapted the following account from those given in several lucid and entertaining
papers by the physicist N. David Mermin—see particularly his (1985) and (1981).
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2. Ypiaria.
By modern standards the criminal code of Ypiaria10 allowed its police force
excessive powers of arrest and interrogation. Random detention and questioning
were accepted weapons in the fight against serious crime. This is not to say that
the police had an entirely free hand, however. On the contrary, there were strict
constraints on the questions the police could address to anyone detained in this
way. One question only could be asked, to be chosen at random from a list of
three: (1) Are you a murderer? (2) Are you a thief? (3) Have you committed
adultery? Detainees who answered “yes” to the chosen question were punished
accordingly, while those who answered “no” were immediately released. (Lying
seems to have been frowned on, but no doubt was not unknown.)
To ensure that these guide-lines were strictly adhered to, records were re-
quired to be kept of every such interrogation. Some of these records have sur-
vived, and therein lies our present concern. The records came to be analysed by
the psychologist Alexander Graham Doppelga¨nger, known for his work on twins
and co-operative behaviour. Doppelga¨nger realised that amongst the many mil-
lions of cases in the surviving records there were likely to be some in which
the Ypiarian police had interrogated both members of a pair of twins. He was
interested in whether in such cases any correlation could be observed between
the answers given by each twin.
As we now know, Doppelga¨nger’s interest was richly rewarded. He uncovered
the two striking and seemingly incompatible correlations now known collectively
as Doppelga¨nger’s Twin Paradox. He found that
same When each member of a pair of twins was asked the same question, both
always gave the same answer;
and that
diff When each member of a pair of twins was asked a different question, they
gave the same answer on close to 25% of such occasions.
It may not be immediately apparent that these results are in any way incom-
patible. But Doppelga¨nger reasoned as follows. same means that whatever it is
that disposes Ypiarians to answer Y or N to each of the three possible questions
1, 2 and 3, it is a disposition that twins always have in common. For example,
if “YYN” signifies the property of being disposed to answer Y to questions 1
and 2 and N to question 3, then correlation
same implies that if one twin is YYN then so is his or her sibling. Similarly for
the seven other possible such states: in all, for the eight possible permutations
of two possible answers to three possible questions. (The possibilities are the
two “homogeneous” states YYY and NNN, and the six “inhomogeneous” states
YYN, YNY, NYY, YNN, NYN and NNY.)
10Pronounced, of course, “E-P-Aria”.
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Turning now to diff, Doppelga¨nger saw that there were six ways to ask a
different question to each of a pair of twins: the possibilities we may represent by
Q12, Q21, Q13, Q31, Q23 and Q32 (“Qij” thus signifies that the first twin is asked
question i and the second question j). How many of these possibilities would
produce the same answer from both twins? Clearly it depends on the twins’
shared dispositions. If both twins are YYN, for example, then Q12 and Q21 will
produce the same response (in this case, Y) and the other four possibilities will
produce different responses. So if YYN twins were questioned at random, we
should expect the same response from each in about 1/3 of all cases. Similarly
for YNY twins, YNN twins, or for any of the other inhomogeneous states. And
for homogeneous states, of course, all six possible question pairs produce the
same result: YYY twins will always answer Y and NNN twins will always answer
N.
Hence, Doppelga¨nger realised, we should expect a certain minimum correla-
tion in these different question cases. We cannot tell how many pairs of Ypiarian
twins were in each of the eight possible states, but we can say that whatever
their distribution, confessions should correlate with confessions and denials with
denials in at least 1/3 of the different question interrogations. For the figure
should be 1/3 if all twins are in inhomogeneous states, and higher if some are
in homogeneous states. And yet, as diff describes, the records show a much
lower figure.
Doppelga¨nger initially suspected that this difference might be a mere sta-
tistical fluctuation. As newly examined cases continued to confirm the same
pattern, however, he realised that the chances of such a variation were infinites-
imal. His next thought was therefore that the Ypiarian twins must generally
have known what question the other was being asked, and determined their own
answer partly on this basis. He saw that it would be easy to explain diff if
the nature of one’s twin’s question could influence one’s own answer. Indeed, it
would be easy to make a total anti-correlation in the different question cases be
compatible with same—with total correlation in the same question cases.
Doppelga¨nger investigated this possibility with some care. He found however
that twins were always interrogated separately and in isolation. As required,
their chosen questions were selected at random, and only after they had been
separated from one another. There therefore seemed no way in which twins
could conspire to produce the results described in same and diff. Moreover,
there seemed a compelling physical reason to discount the view that the question
asked of one twin might influence the answers given by another. This was that
the separation of such interrogations was usually space-like in the sense of special
relativity; in other words, neither interrogation occurred in either the past or
the future light-cone of the other. (It is not that the Ypiarian police force was
given to space travel, but that light travelled more slowly in those days. The
speed of a modern carrier pigeon is the best current estimate.) Hence according
to the principle of the relativity of simultaneity, there was no determinate sense
in which one interrogation took place before the other. How then could it be a
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determinate matter whether interrogation 1 influenced interrogation 2, or vice
versa?11
How are we to explain Doppelga¨nger’s remarkable observations? Doppel-
ga¨nger himself seems reluctantly to have favoured the telepathic hypothesis—the
view that despite the lack of any evident mechanism, and despite the seeming
incompatibility with the conceptual framework of special relativity, Ypiarian
twins were capable of being “instantaneously” influenced by their sibling’s dis-
tant experiences. Doppelga¨nger was well aware that there is an hypothesis that
explains same and diff without conflicting with special relativity. It is that the
twins possess not telepathy but precognition, and thus know in advance what
questions they are to be asked. However, he felt that this interpretation would
force us to the conclusion that the Ypiarian police interrogators were mere au-
tomatons, not genuinely free to choose what questions to ask their prisoners.
Other commentators have dismissed the interpretation on different grounds,
claiming that it would give rise to causal paradoxes.
In my view neither of these objections is philosophically well-founded. The
relativity-friendly alternative that Doppelga¨nger rejects is certainly counter-
intuitive, but it is not absurd. Given the nature of the case, any workable
explanation will be initially counterintuitive. What matters is whether that
intuition withstands rigorous scrutiny, and of course how much gain we get for
any remaining intuitive pain. Doppelga¨nger himself was well aware of the gains
that would flow from the interpretation in question (especially that it saves
special relativity), but thought the pain too high. I want to show that he was
mistaken.12
3. Advanced action: how it explains the Twin Paradox.
Very little is known about the factors which must have governed an Ypiarian’s
answers to the three questions permitted under Ypiarian law. The surviving
records tell us what was said but not in general why it was said. The psycho-
logical variables are hidden from us, and must be inferred, if at all, from the
behavioural data to which we have access. However, the puzzling character of
the data is easily explained if we allow that the relevant variables display what
physicists call advanced action: the property that the underlying psycholog-
ical variables may depend on the future experiences of the agents concerned.
Specifically, what is required is that pairs of twins who are in fact going to be
11There are a number of concerns that might arise here, but the one that Doppelga¨nger
seems to have found most pressing is this: if we allow space-like influences of this kind,
then if it is not to be an arbitrary matter at what time a given influence “arrives”, certain
inertial frames must be physically distinguished from others, in violation of the spirit of special
relativity.
12In saying this I am claiming no special insight or competence with respect to Ypiarian
psychology, of course. My suggestion is simply that the specialists in that field have been led
astray by considerations which fall more within philosophy than within their own discipline.
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asked different questions are therefore more likely to adopt an inhomogeneous
state that yields different answers to those questions. Hidden variables are thus
dependent on the fate of the agents concerned, as well on their history.
Consider for example a pair of twins Tdum and Tdee whose fate is in fact to
be asked questions 2 and 3 respectively. Doppelga¨nger’s correlation diff suggests
that this fate has the effect of making it less likely that Tdum and Tdee will be in
the states YYY, YNN, NYY and NNN that yield the same answer to questions
2 and 3; and correspondingly more likely that Tdum and Tdee will be in one
of the states YYN, YNY, NYN and NNY that yield different answers to these
questions.
Unlike Doppelga¨nger’s instantaneous action-at-a-distance, this advanced ac-
tion proposal does not conflict with special relativity. This is because the point
at which twins become coupled—whether their conception, their birth, or some
later meeting—lies well within the light-cones of both their later interrogations.
The effect is not instantaneous and not at a space-like distance. And it needs
no mysterious carrier. It has the twins themselves, who bear the marks of their
future as they bear the marks of their past.
Why has this interpretation not appealed to Doppelga¨nger and other special-
ists in this field? As noted earlier, it is because they think that there is something
absurd or contradictory in the idea that present events might exhibit this kind
of correlation with future events. The objection resolves into two main strands.
The first, which seems to have been the more influential in Doppelga¨nger’s own
case, is the intuition that advanced action leads to fatalism—that it is incompat-
ible with the ordinary supposition that the future events concerned are ones with
respect to which we (or the Ypiarian interrogators) have independent present
control and freedom of choice. We shall return to this strand of the objection
in section 5.
The second strand of the objection is the claim that the correlations required
for advanced action could be exploited to yield “causal paradoxes” of one kind
or another. This claim depends on a venerable line of reasoning, essentially the
so-called “bilking argument”. But what are these paradoxes, and need they
arise in the Ypiarian case? I think we can show that they might not.
4. Causal paradox?
The supposed paradox is familiar from countless science fiction stories. The
hero travels into her own past and takes steps to ensure that she will not exist
at the time she left—she kills her young self, introduces her mother-to-be to
contraception, persuades her Author to take up accounting, or something of the
kind. The results are contradictory: the story tells us that something is both
true and not true. It is like being told that it was the best of times and the worst
of times, except that we are offered an account of how this contradictory state of
affairs came to pass. This has the literary advantage of separating the beginning
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of the story from the end, and the logical advantage of allowing us to conclude
that something in the offered account is false. In physical rather than literary
mode we can thus argue against the possibility of time travel: if there were time
travel we could design an experiment with contradictory results; ergo, there is
no time travel.13 And as for time travel, so for backward causation. Causing
one’s young self to have been pushed under a bus is just as suicidal as travelling
in time to do the deed oneself.
In summary, then, the view that backward causation leads to causal para-
doxes rests on the claim that if there were such causation, it could be exploited
to allow retroactive suicide and other less dramatic but equally absurd physical
results. But is this true of the kind of backward influence I claimed to find in
the Ypiarian case? Could YES, the Ypiarian Euthanasia Society,14 exploit it in
the interests of painless deaths for its aging members?
Unfortunately not, I think. For what is the earlier effect—the claimed result
of the later fact that a pair of twins Tdum and Tdee are asked questions 2 and
3, say? It is that the state in which Tdum and Tdee separate is less likely to be
one of those (YYY, YNN, NYY or NNN) in which questions 2 and 3 give the
same response. For simplicity let us ignore the probability, making the effect
correspondingly stronger. Assume, in other words, that such a fate guarantees
that Tdum and Tdee will not be in one of these states. Retroactive suicide
then requires that this effect be wired to produce the desired result—that a
device be constructed that kills the intended victim if Tdum and Tdee do not
have one of the excluded states. (This machine might be too generous, if other
future possibilities do not prevent the past state of affairs that triggers it; but
this won’t worry the members of YES, who will not be concerned that they
might already have killed themselves—accidentally, as it were.) The trigger
thus needs to detect the relevant states of Tdum and Tdee, before the occurrence
of the claimed future influence on these states—before Tdum and Tdee are next
interrogated by the Ypiarian police. But why suppose it is physically possible to
construct such a detector? We know these states can be detected by the process
of interrogation—in effect they are dispositions to respond to such interrogation
in a certain way—but this is not to say that they are ever revealed in any other
way.
We thus have the prospect of an answer to the bilking objection. The thought
13I am simplifying here, of course. For one thing it is clear that even given the hypothesis of
time travel, we are never actually justified in expecting the experiment to yield contradictory
results, for logic alone rules that out. A number of authors have made this the basis of a
defence of the possibility of time travel against the bilking argument. (See Horwich (1975),
Lewis (1976) and Thom (1974), for example.) This issue is not directly relevant to our present
concerns, which exploit a much larger loophole in the bilking argument. In passing, however,
let me record my view—similar to that of Horwich (1987), ch. 7—that the bilking argument
survives the former challenge. Roughly speaking, it shows us that hypothesis of time travel can
be made to imply propositions of arbitrarily low probability. This is not a classical reductio,
but it is as close as science ever gets.
14“YES for the right to say NO!”, as their slogan goes.
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experiments involved rest on an assumption that might simply be false. The
supposedly paradoxical experiment might be physically impossible. This is a
familiar kind of response to such arguments in science. Consider for example the
old argument that space must be infinite, since if it were finite one could journey
to the edge and extend one’s arm. One response to this is to point out that
even if space were finite the required journey might be physically impossible,
because a finite space need have no edges.
It is perhaps impossible at this distance to adjudicate on the Ypiarian case.
Doppelga¨nger’s work notwithstanding, we know too little of Ypiarian psychology
to be able to say whether the relevant states would have been detectable before
interrogation. It is enough that because the bilking argument depends on this
assumption, the backward causation proposal remains a live option.15
5. The fatalist objection.
Now to Doppelga¨nger’s own main concern about the advanced action interpre-
tation, namely that it seems to deny free will. If the Ypiarian interrogators’
choices of questions are correlated with the earlier psychological states of the
twins concerned, then surely their apparent freedom of choice is illusory. For
when they come to “decide” what questions to ask their “choice” is already
fixed—already “written” in the mental states of their interviewees. This is the
fatalist objection to advanced action.
The first thing to note about the fatalist objection is that it tends to slide
back into a version of the bilking argument. If we think of “already determined”
as implying “accessible”, then we seem to have the basis of a paradox-generating
thought experiment. Since we have already discussed the bilking argument, let
us assume that “already determined” does not imply “accessible”. What then
remains of the fatalist point?
The strategic difficulty now is to set aside this objection to advanced action
without calling on a philosophical dissertation on the topic of free will. Two
points seem to be in order. The first is that even if the argument were sound, it
would not show that advanced action is physically impossible. Rather it would
show that advanced action is physically incompatible with the existence of free
will. In the interests of theoretical simplicity the appropriate conclusion might
then be that there is no free will. Free will might then seem another piece
of conceptual anthropocentrism, incompatible (as it turns out) with our best
theories of the physical world. So the fatalist objection is strictly weaker than
the causal paradox argument. If successful the latter shows that advanced action
is physically impossible; the former, at best, merely that it is incompatible with
free will.
15The fact that the bilking argument depends on an assumption of this kind was pointed
out by Michael Dummett (1964). Later we shall see that quantum mechanics is tailor-made
to exploit Dummett’s loophole.
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The second thing to be said about the fatalist objection is that it has a much
more familiar twin. This is the argument that if statements about our future
actions are “already” either true or false (even if we can’t know which), then
we are not free to decide one way or the other. There are differing views of
this argument among philosophers. The majority opinion seems to be that it is
fallacious, but some think that the argument does rule out free will, and others
that free will is only saved by denying truth values to statements about the
future. On the last point, physicists perhaps have more reason than most to
grant determinate truth values to statements about the future. Contemporary
physics is usually held to favour the four dimensional or “block universe” view
of temporal metaphysics, whereas the thesis that future truth values are inde-
terminate is typically thought to require the rival “tensed” view of temporal
reality.
If we accept that statements about the future have truth values then there
are two possibilities. If the ordinary fatalist argument is sound, then there is no
free will. But in this case the fatalist argument against advanced action is beside
the point. If there is no free will anyway, then it is no objection to advanced
action if it implies that there is none. If the ordinary argument is unsound,
on the other hand, then so surely is the backward version. For the arguments
are formally parallel. If the refutation of the forward version does not depend
on what makes it the forward version—in effect, on the special status of future
tensed statements—then it depends on what the two versions have in common.
If one argument fails then so does the other.
Indeed, what it seems plausible to say in the future case is something like this:
statements about the future do have truth values, and some of these statements
concern events or states of affairs which do stand in a relation of constraint,
or dependence, with respect to certain of our present actions. However, what
gives direction to the relation—what makes it appropriate to say that it is our
actions that “fix” the remote events, rather than vice versa—is that the actions
concerned are our actions, or products of our free choices. The fatalist’s basic
mistake is to fail to notice the degree to which our talk of (directed) dependency
rides on the back of our conception of ourselves as free agents. Once noted,
however, the point applies as much in reverse, in the special circumstances in
which the bilking argument is blocked.
At any rate, the more basic point is that the fatalist argument usefully dis-
tinguishes the backward case only if two propositions hold: (a) the classical
(future-directed) fatalist argument is valid, and thus sound if future tensed
statements do have truth values; and (b) there is a significant difference be-
tween the past and the future, in that past tensed statements do have truth
values, whereas future tensed statements do not. Proposition (a) is a rather
unpopular position in a philosophical debate of great antiquity. Proposition (b)
is perhaps a less uncommon position, but one that modern physicists seem to
have more reason than most to reject. Taken together, as they need to be if
the fatalist objection to the advanced action interpretation is not to collapse,
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these propositions thus form an unhealthy foundation for an objection to an
otherwise promising scientific theory.
6. Quantum mechanics and backward causation.
The point of the Ypiarian example lies, of course, in the fact that it exactly
mirrors the puzzling behaviour of certain two-particle quantum-mechanical sys-
tems. Doppelga¨nger’s same is effectively the feature of EPR systems on which
the original EPR argument relied. And diff is the additional feature whose
conflict with same was noted by Bell in 1965. The case mirrors Bohm’s ver-
sion of the EPR experiment. The pairs of twins correspond to pairs of spin-1/2
particles in the singlet state. The act of asking a twin one of three specified
questions corresponds to the Stern-Gerlach determination of the spin of such a
particle in one of three equi-spaced directions perpendicular to the line of flight.
The answers Y and N correspond on one side to the results “spin up” and “spin
down” and on the other side to the reverse. Thus a case in which both twins give
the same answer corresponds to one in which spin measurements give opposite
results. Correlations same and diff follow from the following consequence of
quantum mechanics: when the orientation of the Stern-Gerlach measurements
differ by an angle a then the probability of spin measurements on each particle
yielding opposite values is cos2(α/2). This probability is 1 when α = 0 (same)
and 1/4 when α = ±120◦ (diff).
These predictions have been confirmed in a series of increasingly sophisticated
experiments.16 Thus if you thought the proper response to the Ypiaria story
was that it was simply unrealistic, you should think again. Not only is the
perplexing behaviour of Ypiarian twins theoretically and practically mirrored
in quantum mechanics, but quantum mechanics actually tells us what sort of
neurophysiology would make people behave like that. All we have to suppose
is that the brains of Ypiarian twins contain the appropriate sort of correlated
spin-1/2 particles (one particle in each twin), and that interrogation causes a
spin determination, the result of which governs the answer given.
As in the Ypiarian case, it is easy to explain Bell’s results if we allow that
particle states can be influenced by their fate as well as their history. One way
to do it is to allow for a probabilistic “discoupling factor” which depends on the
actual spin measurements to be performed on each particle and which influences
the underlying spin properties of the particles concerned. We simply say that
the production of such particle pairs is governed by the following constraint:
set In those directions G and H (if any) in which the spins are going to be mea-
sured, the probability that the particles have opposite spins is cos2(α/2),
where α is the angle between G and H.
16Most notably those of Alain Aspect et. al.—see Mermin (1985), pp. 45-6.
14
Note that this condition refers to the fate of the particles concerned; it allows
that their present properties are in part determined by the future conditions they
are to encounter. Thus it explicitly violates Bell’s Independence Assumption.17
How does set cope with the kind of objections to advanced action that
we dealt with in the Ypiarian case? We saw that the causal paradox objection
rested on assumption that the claimed earlier effect could be detected in time to
prevent the occurrence of its supposed later cause. What does this assumption
amount to in the quantum mechanics case? Here the claimed earlier effect is the
arrangement of spins in the directions G and H which are later to be measured.
But what would it take to detect this arrangement in any particular case? It
would take, clearly, a measurement of the spins of particles concerned in the
directions G and H. However, such a measurement is precisely the kind of event
which is being claimed to have this earlier effect. So there seems to be no way
to set up the experiment whose contradictory results would constitute a causal
paradox. By the time the earlier effect has been detected its later cause has
already taken place.18
The advanced action explanation of Bell’s results thus lacks the major hand-
icap with which it has usually been saddled. On the other side, it has the
advantages we noted in the Ypiarian case. For one thing, it does not seem to
call for any new field or bearer of the influence that one measurement exerts on
another. If we think of the fate of a particle as a property of that particle—a
property which has a bearing on the results of its interaction with its twin—then
the particles themselves “convey” the relevant influence to its common effect at
the point at which they separate. More importantly, by thus confining the retro-
influence of future measurements to their past light-cones, the advanced action
account avoids action at a distance, and hence the threat of conflict with special
relativity.
The extent of the last advantage clearly depends on how much alternative
explanations do conflict with special relativity. This has been a topic of consid-
erable discussion in recent years.19 It is widely agreed that the Bell correlations
do not permit faster than light signalling, but the issue of “causal influence” is
less straightforward. Whatever the nature of the influence, the concern seems
in part to be that special relativity implies that any space-like influence will be
17set should be taken simply as an illustration of the general strategy, of course. Recall that
we began with Bell’s own observation that if we are prepared to abandon the Independence
Assumption, his results no longer stand in the way of a local hidden variable theory for
quantum mechanics—a local realist theory, in Einstein’s sense. The issue of the best form
for such a theory is a technical matter, beyond the scope of the present paper. The present
argument is simply that in philosophical terms Bell’s loophole is much more attractive than
it has usually been taken to be, and hence that the technical strategy it embodies has been
unjustly neglected.
18In effect, quantum mechanics thus builds in exactly what we need to exploit the Dum-
mettian loophole in the bilking argument.
19There is an up-to-date analysis in Butterfield (1994), and a survey of the field in Maudlin
(1994), chs. 4-6.
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a backward influence from the point of view of some inertial frame of reference.
Backward influence has seemed problematic on the grounds we have already
examined: “It introduces great problems, paradoxes of causality and so on.”
(Bell again, in Davies and Brown 1986, p. 50) Now if this were the only problem
with Bell’s preferred non-local influences, that fact would weaken our case for
preferring backward to space-like influence; for it would mean that in rejecting
the usual argument against backward causation we would also be removing the
main obstacle to Bell’s own faster-than-light interpretation of the phenomena.
There is another problem with Bell’s view, however, namely the concern we
noted in the Ypiarian case: a space-like influence seems to distinguish one iner-
tial frame of reference from all the rest—it picks out the unique frame according
to which the influence concerned is instantaneous. This appears to contradict
the accepted interpretation of special relativity, namely that all inertial frames
are physically equivalent. It was this consequence to which Bell was referring
in the passages I quoted at the beginning of the paper. As he puts it elsewhere,
the view commits us to saying that “there are influences going faster than light,
even if we cannot control them for practical telegraphy. Einstein local causality
fails, and we must live with this.” (1987, p. 110) As I have emphasised, the
advanced action interpretation requires no such reconstruction of special rela-
tivity. So unless there is more to be held against this approach than the charges
of fatalism and causal paradox, it would appear to offer a rather promising
explanation of the Bell correlations.
I have concentrated on the EPR cases because it is here that in virtue of the
threatened conflict with special relativity the advantages of backward influence
(or advanced action) are most apparent. Concerning quantum mechanics more
generally, I think its appeal turns on its ability to revitalise that other aspect
of Einstein’s world view, namely the conviction that quantum mechanics pro-
vides an incomplete description of the physical world. As I noted earlier, the
extent to which Bell’s Theorem undermines this Einsteinian view is commonly
exaggerated. The present loophole aside, Bell’s result simply undermines lo-
cal versions of such a view—which, given that it appears to undermine locality
generally, can hardly be counted a decisive objection to Einstein. All the same,
the present loophole does seem to swing the argument strongly in favour of the
Einstein view: given that orthodox quantum mechanics does not embody the
required “backward influence”, only a model which takes the orthodox theory
to be incomplete will be capable of doing so. Only some version of the Einstein
view seems able to save locality in this way.20
A revitalised Einsteinian view would have the attractions it always held for
the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Its great virtue is that because it
denies that the collapse of the wave function corresponds to a real change in the
physical system concerned, it does not encounter the so-called “Measurement
20Far from being the man who proved Einstein wrong, Bell thus appears in this light to be
the man who provided a new reason to think that Einstein was right.
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Problem”, which is essentially the problem of providing a principled answer
to the question as to exactly when such changes take place. The fact that the
Measurement Problem is an artefact of a particular way of interpreting quantum
mechanics has tended to be forgotten as the views of Einstein’s Copenhagen
opponents have become the orthodoxy, but it was well appreciated in the early
days of the theory. As Lockwood (1989, pp. 196-7) makes clear, the point of
Schro¨dinger’s original use of his famous feline gedankenexperiment was precisely
to distinguish these two ways of looking at quantum theory, and to point out
that unlike the view of the theory that he himself shared with Einstein, that of
their Copenhagen opponents would be saddled with the problem of the nature
and timing of measurement.
Although it avoids the standard Measurement Problem, it might seem that
the view I am suggesting—Einsteinian realism with advanced action—will face
a measurement problem of its own. For if the claim is that earlier hidden vari-
ables are affected by later measurement settings, don’t we still need a principled
account of what counts as a measurement? This is a good point, but the ap-
propriate response seems not to be to try to distinguish measurements from
physical interactions in general, but to note that it is a constraint on any sat-
isfactory development of this strategy for quantum theory that the advanced
effects it envisages be products of physical interactions in general, rather than
products of some special class of “measurement” interactions.
This point is relevant to another charge that might be levelled against the
suggested approach. It might be argued that the approach fails to respect the
core thesis of Einstein’s realism, namely the principle that there is an objective
world whose nature and reality are independent of human observers. If our
present measurements affect the prior state of what we observe, then surely the
external world is not independent in Einstein’s sense. Had we chosen to make
a different measurement, the external world would have been different. Isn’t
this very much like the observer-dependence that Einstein found objectionable
in the Copenhagen view?
I think it is best to answer this charge indirectly. First of all, I think we may
assume that Einstein would not have felt that his brand of realism was threat-
ened by the observation that human activities affect the state of the external
world in all sorts of ordinary ways. The existence of trains, planes and laser
beams does not impugn realism. The processes that produce such things are
simply physical processes, albeit physical processes of rather specialised kinds.
Secondly, it seems fair to assume that backward causation is not in itself contrary
to spirit of Einsteinian realism. On the contrary, a realist of Einstein’s empiri-
cist inclinations might well think that the direction of causation is a matter to
be discovered by physics.21 But then why should the existence of backward ef-
fects of human activities be any more problematic for realism than the existence
21To the extent that causation itself is regarded as a physically respectable notion, at any
rate. Other views are possible, of course, but then the objection to backward causation will
not be specifically that it threatens classical realism.
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of their “forward” cousins? Provided we make it clear that in the first place
the view is that certain physical interactions have earlier effects, and not that
certain specifically human activities do so, the position does not seem to be one
that an empiricist of Einstein’s realist persuasions should object to a priori. For
what the view proposes, roughly speaking, is simply to extend to the case of the
past a form of lack of independence that realists find unproblematic in the case
of the future. The proposal might perhaps be objectionable for other reasons,
but it does not conflict with realist intuitions of Einstein’s sort.
In summary, then, the advanced action approach promises the usual virtues of
the “incompleteness” interpretation of quantum mechanics favoured by Schro¨d-
inger, Born, Einstein, Bohm and Bell himself. Unlike other versions of this view
(and apparently all versions of the opposing orthodoxy), it also promises to save
locality, and therefore to avoid the threatened conflict between quantum me-
chanics and special relativity. The restrictions that quantum mechanics places
on measurement enable the approach to exploit a well-recognised loophole in
the bilking argument—while interpreting the required failure of the Indepen-
dence Assumption in terms of backward causation seems to sidestep Bell’s own
concerns about free will.
7. Conceptual inertia and the puzzle of causal asymmetry.
Striking as it is, however, I have come to appreciate that the above argument
has the following rather disappointing characteristic: it is almost completely
unpersuasive.22 Even its most receptive audiences seem to find themselves in
the grip of a kind of conceptual inertia—a phenomenon to which, as it stands,
the argument simply makes no concessions. In effect, the argument assumes that
the ordinary view that there is no backward causation is just another scientific
hypothesis, amenable to revision on empirical grounds. But causation is a pre-
scientific notion, deeply ingrained in folk usage and philosophically problematic.
At the very least, therefore, an argument with such radical conclusions on the
subject needs to be backed up with a kind of metaphysical user’s manual—a
guide to some of the philosophical issues in the background, so that interested
parties might have a better sense as to what they are being invited to endorse.
One function for such a guide might well be cognitive therapy. The unpop-
ularity of the backward causation approach to the interpretation of quantum
mechanics—a field not noted for metaphysical conservatism!—itself suggests
that the intuitions that oppose it are very deeply ingrained. In order to give the
approach a fair hearing, then, it seems appropriate to ask where these intuitions
come from, and why they are so resistant to arguments of the above kind. As
22Perhaps I’m being unduly pessimistic here, but try the following experiment: imagine that
you find the steps in the argument individually convincing, so that you now accept that the
advanced action interpretation has the advantages described above. Are you now disposed to
believe that quantum mechanics shows that the world contains backward causation? I suspect
not, for the kind of reasons outlined below.
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in psychoanalysis, uncovering the aetiology of our aversions might be the first
step to their successful treatment.
Whatever the motivation for the project, however, an obvious starting point
is a reflection on the nature and origins of causal asymmetry in “classical”
cases. One of the puzzling features of our intuitions concerning the temporal
asymmetry of causation and physical dependency is that they seem to be quite
independent of what we know of the temporal symmetry of the underlying
physical processes concerned. This is especially striking in simple microphysical
examples. Consider, for example, a photon emitted from an excited atom in
some distant galaxy, and eventually absorbed in the reverse process on Earth
(perhaps in a detector connected to a telescope). Suppose that the photon
happens to pass through polarisers at both ends of its journey. By our intuitive
standards, nothing could be more natural than the thought that while the state
of the photon as it nears the Earth might depend on the setting of the distant
polariser (perhaps million of years in its past), it doesn’t depend on the setting of
the local polariser (perhaps only microseconds in its future). Yet if the physics is
symmetric—if from the physical point of view it is simply a conventional matter
which extremity of the photon’s journey we choose to regard as the beginning
and which the end—then what could possibly explain this difference?
As this example illustrates, there is a prima facie tension between the striking
temporal symmetry of contemporary physical theory and the prevailing intuition
that causation is not only asymmetric but “unidirectional”—always oriented in
the same temporal direction. True, this tension is commonly said to be defused
by the recognition that causal direction is a physically contingent feature of
the world—“fact-like” rather than “law-like”, as physicists often say. But given
that this response usually associates causal direction with the thermodynamic
asymmetry, itself normally taken to be statistical and thus macroscopic in origin,
it is doubtful whether it provides much support for applying our ordinary causal
intuitions to microphysics.23
In my view the most plausible resolution of the apparent tension rests on the
thesis that the asymmetry of causal dependency is anthropocentric in origin.
Roughly, the suggestion is that we ourselves are asymmetric in time, and that
this subjective asymmetry comes to be embedded in the way we talk about
the world. To argue this way is not to deny that there are objective temporal
asymmetries in the physical world. It is simply to point out that some of the
apparently “external” asymmetries may be “internal” in origin.24 Thus the
asymmetry we think we see in the photon case is explained as a shadow of a
23I develop this objection in Price (1992).
24The claim is not undermined by the requirement that the “internal” asymmetries con-
cerned should themselves be explicable “externally”—i.e., in terms of objective physical asym-
metries in the world—so long as the latter asymmetries are not those being held to be pro-
jections of our own internal asymmetry. A plausible hypothesis is that our own existence
and temporal asymmetry is ultimately explicable in terms of the thermodynamic asymme-
try of the universe in which we live. This explanation does not presuppose an objective
causalasymmetry, however.
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real asymmetry elsewhere, and no longer seems in conflict with the symmetry
of the photon’s intrinsic physics.
In the present context, another advantage of this suggestion might seem to
be that it promises to explain why the backward causation interpretation of
Bell’s results meets with such resistance. If ordinary causal talk is a product
of some very basic characteristics of the sort of creatures we are, small wonder
that it is so deeply entrenched, and that we find it so difficult to revise. This
argument needs to be handled with care, however, for if causal asymmetry is
anthropocentric, how can there be an objective issue as to whether causation
is “forward” or “backward”? The objective content of the backward causation
strategy seems to have been lost.
We shall be able to turn this point to our advantage, however. The view that
the asymmetry of dependency is anthropocentric will enable us to clarify the
objective core of the advanced action proposal. The trick will be to distinguish
between two kinds of correlational structures for the world. From the standard
point of view one possible structure “looks like” it simply contains ordinary
forward causation, while the other “looks like” it contains a mixture of forward
and backward causation. The latter structure is the one we need to solve Bell’s
riddle. Its objective content lies in its correlational structure, but the causal
viewpoint provides a useful way to distinguish it from the classical alternative.
All the same, it seems that Nature has played a practical joke at this point,
hiding the narrow path to the advanced action interpretation between two much
more clearly marked alternatives: on the one hand the path that accepts that
our intuitive notion of directed causation is of fundamental physical significance;
on the other the path that banishes causation from physics altogether. There
is a middle way, but we shall need to tread carefully.25
So the problem of the asymmetry of dependency—the puzzle exemplified
by the photon case—promises an illuminating route to a deeper understanding
both of what is at issue in the debate about backward causation in quantum
mechanics, and of the place of our ordinary views about causation in our system
of theoretical commitments as a whole. And that in turn promises to counter
the conceptual inertia we noted at the beginning of the section. In so far as
that inertia is rationally grounded, much of it seems to stem from uncertainty
concerning the physical content of the advanced action interpretation; an uncer-
tainty engendered by the philosophical complexities of the relationship between
causation and physics. By clarifying the commitments of the interpretation in
this way, we may thus hope to diminish the grounds for rational conservatism.
25I suspect that the failure to notice this middle way is one reason why the backward
causation approach has been unpopular among physicists. One commentator who seems to
miss it is Bernard d’Espagnat. In discussions of the advanced action interpretation advocated
by Costa de Beauregard (see note 40), d’Espagnat appears to move from an acknowledgment
of the “apparently irreplaceable role of man-centred concepts in the very definition of the
causality concept” to the view that there is little of any novelty or promise in the claim that
quantum mechanics reveals backward causation. See his (1989a), pp. 229-31, and (1989b),
pp. 144-5.
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My treatment of these issues goes like this. The first task is to outline a case
for a treatment of the asymmetry of dependency on the anthropocentric lines
just indicated. The argument will be couched in terms of counterfactual condi-
tionals, which seem to provide the most transparent route to the insights we are
after. As we shall see, a natural objection to this approach is that in tying the
asymmetry of dependency to a conventional feature of our use of counterfactu-
als, it fails to capture the intuitive objectivity of the asymmetry. Responding to
this objection will lead us back to the issue as to whether the approach leaves
room for backward causation, and hence to the main concerns of the paper. I
shall argue that the approach leaves just the space that the advanced action
interpretation requires, and show how it clarifies what is objectively at issue
between this interpretation and its more conventional rivals. Finally, we’ll see
that this clarification puts us in range of a powerful new argument for the inter-
pretation, namely that it seems to respect a temporal symmetry in microphysics
that the classical view is bound to deny.
8. Asymmetry conventionalised.
The intuition I appealed to above was that the state of our photon does not
depend on the fact that it is going to pass through a polarising lens in the
near future, but may depend on the fact that it passed through such a lens in
the distant past. What makes this intuition puzzling is that it is temporally
asymmetric, without there being any apparent basis for such an asymmetry in
the physical phenomena themselves.
A useful approach to this puzzle is to do away with explicit talk of depen-
dency, by couching the intuitive asymmetry in counterfactual terms. Intuitively,
it seems true that
(1) If the distant polariser had been differently oriented the incoming photon
might now be in a different state (or might not have arrived here at all);
and yet false that
(2) If the local polariser had been differently oriented, the state of the incom-
ing photon might have been different.
Granted that this contrast seems to capture the intuitive asymmetry, a tempt-
ing suggestion is that the asymmetry doesn’t really have anything to do with
the physical entities themselves, but is buried in the content of counterfactual
claims. After all, a popular account of the semantics of counterfactuals goes
something like this. When we assess a counterfactual of the form “If X had
happened at t1 then Y would have happened at t2” we consider the conse-
quences of a hypothetical alteration in the course of events. We “hold fixed”
the course of events prior to t1, assume that X occurs at that time, and consider
the course of events that follows. Roughly speaking, we take the conditional to
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be true if Y at t2 is a consequence of the joint assumption of the actual history
prior to t1 and the occurrence of X at t1.
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According to this account, (1) says that if we hold fixed the history of the
photon before it reaches the distant polariser, but assume that polariser to be
differently oriented, we may derive different consequences for the state of the
photon before it reaches the Earth (i.e., in the region between the two polaris-
ers). Whereas (2) says that if we hold fixed the history of the photon before it
reaches the local polariser, and assume that polariser to be oriented differently,
we may derive different consequences for the state of the photon before it reaches
the local polariser. The latter claim is clearly false, but for a rather trivial rea-
son: the state of the photon doesn’t change under the assumed circumstances,
because the assumption includes the supposition that it doesn’t!27
The standard semantics for counterfactuals thus dissolves the puzzle of the
photon case. Why doesn’t the present affect the past? Because to say that
the present affected the past would just be to say that if the present had been
different the past would have been different. And that in turn is just to say
that if we suppose the present to be different, while the past remains the same,
it will follow that the past is different. This is untrue, of course, but simply on
logical grounds. No physical asymmetry is required to explain it.
But is this the right way of dissolving the tension? An obvious objection is
that it makes our ability to affect the future but not the past a conventional
or terminological matter. After all, couldn’t we have adopted the opposite
convention, assessing counterfactuals by holding the future fixed—in which case
wouldn’t we now be saying that present events depend on the future but not
the past? And if there is this alternative way of doing things, how could one
way be right and other way wrong? How could it be objectively the case, as it
seems to be, that we can affect the future but not the past?
This objection might have a second aspect to it, closely related to our present
concerns: we might feel that even if the past doesn’t depend on the future, it
isn’t logically impossible that it should do so, in the way that this diagnosis
would suggest. The suggested account of counterfactuals thus seems in one
sense too weak, in failing to give due credit to a genuine difference between the
past and the future; and in another sense too strong, in ruling out backward
dependency by fiat.
In the next section I shall sketch what seems to me to be an adequate response
to this objection, and try to show how it illuminates our main concern.28 The
latter aspect of the objection is the more directly relevant of the two, of course,
but the former is the more crucial to the credentials of the anthropocentric
approach to asymmetry as a whole, and needs to be tackled first.
26See Jackson (1977), for example.
27(2) isn’t really the temporal image of (1), in other words, and so the difference in their
truth values doesn’t constitute a genuine temporal asymmetry.
28A thorough response to the objection would involve a critique of alternative accounts of
the asymmetry of dependency. I shall not attempt this here, but see my (1992) and (1993).
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9. Convention objectified.
The objection is that the conventionalist account would make the asymmetry of
dependency less objective than it actually seems to be—a matter of choice, in
effect. The appropriate response, I think, is to draw attention to the constraints
on this “choice” imposed by the circumstances in which we find ourselves, and
over which we have no control. Because these constraints are so familiar we
fail to notice them, and mistake the asymmetry they impose for an objective
feature of the world. The moral is that things may seem more objective than
they actually are, when the source of the subjectivity is not an obvious one.
The main constraint turns on the fact that counterfactuals are used in delib-
eration, and that deliberation is a temporally asymmetric process. Considered
as structures in spacetime, agents (or “deliberators”) are asymmetric, and thus
orientable along their temporal axis. The crucial point is that this orientation
is not something an agent is able to choose or change. From an agent’s point
of view it is simply one of the “givens”, one of the external constraints within
which she or he operates.
Thus although our temporal orientation is probably a contingent matter—
there might be agents with the opposite temporal orientation elsewhere in the
universe—it is not something that we can change. Given what we do with
counterfactuals in deliberation (more on this in a moment), we thus have no
option but to assess them the way we do—that is, to hold the past rather than
the future fixed. It is objectively true that from our perspective, we can’t affect
our past. Unable to adopt any other perspective, however, and failing to notice
the relevance and contingency of our temporal orientation, we fail to see that
what we have here is a relational truth, a truth about how things are from
a perspective, rather than absolute truth about the world. The account thus
provides a kind of quasi-objectivity. It explains why we think of the asymmetry
of dependency as an objective matter.
The account relies on the claim that agents are asymmetric and thus ori-
entable in time. This doesn’t seem particularly contentious, but it would be
useful to have a better understanding as to what this asymmetry involves. I
think there are two ways to approach the issue. One would seek to characterise
the asymmetry in terms of a formal model of deliberation. Roughly speaking,
the goal would be to map the structure of an ideal deliberative process—to map
it from an atemporal perspective, laying out the steps en bloc—and hence to
be able to point to an intrinsic asymmetry along the temporal axis. This seems
a plausible project, involving little more than transcribing standard dynamic
models of deliberation into an atemporal key.
The other approach would be a phenomenological one, going something like
this. From the inside, as it were, we perceive a difference between the inputs and
the outputs of deliberation—between “incoming information”, which appears
as “fixed”, or “given”, and “outgoing behaviour”, which appears as “open”, or
subject to our control. The contrast is a subjective one, a feature of what it
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feels like to be an agent, so that such difference would not be apparent from
a genuinely external perspective. An atemporal God would just see a pattern
of correlations in both temporal directions between the deliberator’s internal
states and various environmental conditions (and wouldn’t regard the temporal
ordering implied by the terms “input” and “output” as having any objective
significance, of course).29
Either way, where do counterfactuals fit into the picture? We need to think
about the role of counterfactuals in deliberation. An agent normally has the
choice of a number of options, and bases her choice not on the desirability of
the immediate options themselves, but on that of what might be expected to
follow from them. Thus a typical deliberative move is to take what is “given”
or “fixed”—or rather, in practice, what is known of what is taken to be fixed—
and then to add hypothetically one of the available options, and consider what
follows, in accordance with known general principles or laws. The temporal
orientation of this pattern of reasoning follows that of the agent’s perspective.
Broadly speaking, what we hold fixed when assessing counterfactuals according
to the standard semantics is what presents itself to us as fixed from our per-
spective as agents. So long as counterfactuals are to maintain their association
with deliberation,30 in other words, our choice of the “hold the past fixed” con-
vention is governed by the contingent but nevertheless unchangeable fact of our
orientation as agents. We have no choice in the matter.
This account explains the apparent objectivity of the asymmetry of depen-
dency, and thus meets the charge that the conventionalist strategy makes the
asymmetry too weak. However, the objection was that the strategy is also too
strong, in making it analytic and hence a priori that we cannot affect the past.
We now need to show that the conventionalist approach leaves a loophole for
backward causation—in other words, that this anthropocentric account to the
asymmetry of dependency does not backfire on the main project of the paper.31
29This phenomenological account will appeal more than the formal one to philosophers who
seek to ground folk concepts in folk experience. Do we need to adjudicate between the two?
I don’t think so. It seems reasonable to expect that they will turn out to be complimentary.
In effect, the formal approach will simply be describing the internal structure of the pattern
of correlations on which the phenomenological approach depends.
30There is no necessity in this, of course. We could, and in practice certainly do, use
counterfactuals for other purposes. The claim is simply that in those contexts in which the
symmetry of dependency seems vivid to us—contexts such as that of (1) and (2) above—the
use is one which depends on this connection with deliberation.
31Note that what we are interested in showing is that it is an empirical possibility that the
world might contain what we would describe as backward causation; not merely that there
might be differently-oriented creatures who would see it as containing what we would have to
describe—to the extent that we could describe it—as backward causation. The issue is whether
the conventionalist proposal make sense of the idea that even from our own perspective it is
a posteriori that we can’t affect the past.
24
10. Backward dependency legitimised.
The crucial step is to appreciate that although it is a priori is that we can’t
affect what we know about at the time of deliberation, it is a posteriori that
what we can get as input to deliberation is all and only what lies in our past.
It is an interesting question why we should assume that this is the case. Even
if experience teaches us that what we know about via memory and the senses
always lies in the past, we would be affirming the consequent to conclude that
anything that lies in the past is something that might in principle be known
about, and hence something inaccessible to deliberation. In fact, it seems that
the relationship between temporal location and epistemological accessibility is
not only contingent (in both directions), but rather under determined by our
actual experience. For all that our limited experience tells us, there might
actually be some of the past to which we do not have access, and perhaps
some of the future to which we do. The epistemological boundaries seem to
be an empirical matter, therefore, to an extent that ordinary practice tends to
overlook.
Here the point connects with our earlier discussion. We noted in section
4 that as Dummett (1964) points out, that it is possible to avoid the bilking
argument so long as one confines oneself to the claim that one can affect bits
of the past which are epistemologically inaccessible at the time that one acts.
To make the example concrete, suppose it were suggested that the present state
φ of our incoming photon depended on the setting of the local polariser in its
future, as well as on that of the distant polariser in its past. In this case the
bilking argument would require that we measure φ before the photon arrives,
and thereby set the future polariser to conflict with the claimed correlation. So
if the only way to measure φ is to pass the photon through a polariser, and the
claim in question is simply that the value of φ depends on the orientation of the
next polariser it encounters, bilking becomes impossible. Interposing another
measurement would mean that the next measurement is not the one it would
have been otherwise, so that the conditions of the claimed dependency would no
longer obtain. According to the claim under test, such a measurement cannot
be expected to reveal the value that φ would have had if the measurement not
been made.
By slipping into talk of counterfactuals and backward dependency here, I have
tried to illustrate that this admission of limited retro-dependency is not as alien
as might be imagined. It seems in particular that our use of counterfactuals is
already somewhat more flexible than the model we have been using suggests—
already sufficiently flexible to handle the kind of cases that Dummett’s loophole
admits, in fact. What we seem to do in such cases is just what Dummett would
have us do, in effect: we assess counterfactuals not by holding fixed everything
prior to the time of the antecedent condition, but by holding fixed what we
have access to at that time (without disturbing the background conditions of
the claimed correlation).
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This shows how the conventionalist can make sense of the possibility of back-
ward dependency (and thus meet the second part of the objectivist’s challenge).
Note that this response does not require that the ordinary use of counterfactuals
is already unambiguously committed to this possibility, in the sense that it is
already configured to take advantage of the Dummettian loophole. If that were
so the assumption that the past does not depend on the future would surely
be less deeply ingrained than it is in scientific theorising. It seems to me more
accurate to say that there is a systematic indeterminacy in our ordinary notions
of causal and counterfactual dependency. Ordinary usage does not clearly dis-
tinguish two possible conventions for assessing counterfactuals: a mode under
which the entire past is held fixed, and a mode under which only the accessible
past is held fixed. If we follow the former convention then it is analytic that the
state of the incoming photon does not “depend” on the local polariser setting;
whereas if we follow the latter convention it may do so. But this difference
reflects an issue about how we should use the terms involved, rather than a
disagreement about the objective facts of the matter.
The nice thing about this point is that it suggests a natural way of charac-
terising the objective core of the advanced action interpretation. For it is clear
that advocates of the two conventions for counterfactuals might agree on the
relevant categorical facts. In the photon case, for example, they might agree
that there is a one-to-one correlation between some feature of the state of the
incoming photon and the setting of the later polariser.32 The difference is sim-
ply that the second convention (“hold the whole past fixed”) precludes us from
interpreting this correlations in terms of backward influence.
Thus by separating the issue of the correlational structure of the world from
that of the appropriate convention for counterfactuals, we seem to be able to
insulate the empirical question we are interested in—a question concerning the
structure of the microworld—from the heat of folk intuitions about what might
depend on what. Faced with an opponent who claims to find backward depen-
dency incoherent, we can simply concede counterfactual practice, and fall back
to the categorical issue.
The point of this tactical move is to enable us to keep our eye on the issue
that really matters for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it doesn’t
commit us to being even-handed on the issue as to which choice of convention
for counterfactuals would be the more appropriate in a world with correlations
of the imagined kind. It seems to me that there would good reasons for pre-
ferring the weaker convention (“hold fixed the accessible past”), which become
evident if we consider what the stronger convention would have us say about the
imagined case. To simplify as much as possible, suppose that there is agreed to
be a strict correlation between a particular polariser setting S and a particular
earlier state φs of the incoming photon. If counterfactuals are assessed accord-
32Strictly speaking what they will agree on is that this correlation holds in the class of
actual cases of this kind. Modal generalisations might prove contentious.
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ing to the stronger convention, it cannot be the case that both the following
counterfactuals are true (for if we hold fixed events before S, then one conse-
quent or other is bound to be false, even under the counterfactual supposition
in question).
(3) If we were to bring about S, this would ensure that φs
(4) If we were to bring about not-S, this would ensure that not-φs.
Suppose for the sake of argument that the incoming photon is not in state
φs, so that it is (3) that has a false consequent (under the assumption that the
past is held fixed). The two possibilities seem to be to regard (3) as false or to
regard it as somehow meaningless, or otherwise inappropriate. To go the first
way is to say that the agreed correlation between S and φs does not support
counterfactuals. To go the second way seems to be to say that means–end
reasoning breaks down here—that it doesn’t make sense to suppose we might
do S. Neither course seems particularly satisfactory. We are supposing that all
parties acknowledge that as a matter of fact the correlation does always obtain
between S and φs, including on whatever future occasions there might happen to
be on which we bring about S. Outcomes of actual actions thus assured, it is hard
to see how the refusal to acknowledge the corresponding counterfactuals could
seem anything but wilful—so long, at any rate, as we claim the ability to bring
about S at will. Denying free will seems to be an alternative, but in this case it
should be noted that the phenomenology isn’t going to be any different. So there
is nothing to stop us from going through the motions of deliberating, as it were.
Within this scheme of quasi-deliberation we’ll encounter quasi-counterfactuals,
and the question as to how these should be assessed will arise again. Hold fixed
the past, and the same difficulties arise all over again. Hold fixed merely what
is accessible, on the other hand, and it will be difficult to see why this course
was not chosen from the beginning.
Thus I think that if we were to find ourselves in a world in which the notions
of the past and the epistemologically accessible came apart in this way—a world
in which it thus became important to resolve the ambiguity of current counter-
factual usage—a resolution in favour holding fixed merely what is accessible
would be the more satisfactory. For present purposes, however, the important
point is that this issue about how we should use counterfactuals is quite in-
dependent of the empirical issue as to whether the world has the correlational
structure that would require us to make the choice.
In sum, the proposal that the asymmetry of dependency rests on a conven-
tional asymmetry in the content of counterfactual claims leaves open the possi-
bility of exceptional cases, in which the past would indeed be properly said to
depend on the future. But it leaves open this possibility not in the direct sense
that current usage unambiguously admits it, but in the sense that in conceiv-
able physical circumstances the most natural way to clarify and disambiguate
current usage would be such as to recognise such backward influence. Finally,
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it should be emphasised that this sort of backward causation will not be the
time-reverse of ordinary forward causation, since our own temporal orientation
and perspective remains fixed.
Arguing for a bare possibility is one thing. Arguing that the actual world is
like this is quite another, of course, but it is worth noting that any such argument
seems bound to be indirect. The kind of backward influence concerned is not
likely to be directly observable case by case, for the simple reason that if it were,
the bilking argument would again gain a foothold. So the case for such a model of
the world will have to rely on non-observational considerations—considerations
of simplicity, elegance and symmetry, for example. This takes us neatly back to
our starting point. The argument for the advanced action interpretation rested
on a number of theoretical advantages of this kind—especially its ability to avoid
non-locality and hence conflict with special relativity, but also the promise of
the advantages of “incompleteness” interpretations in general. It is useful to be
reminded that we shouldn’t expect evidence of a more direct kind: we shouldn’t
expect to “see” backward influence in action, as it were.
11. The symmetry argument for advanced action.
But is the indirect case as strong as it might be? A tempting thought is that
there might be a symmetry argument in favour of the advanced action view.
If classical views of microphysics turned out to embody a temporal asymmetry
which could be removed by reinterpreting the theories concerned in such a way
as to allow backward dependency, then we would seem to have a strong argument
in favour of such a reinterpretation.33
It is important to note that the simple asymmetry of dependency exemplified
by the photon case is not problematic in this way, being explicable in terms of
the conventional asymmetry of counterfactuals. Recall that the crucial point
was that the counterfactuals (1) and (2) are not genuinely the temporal inverse
of one another, so that their difference in truth value does not require a genuine
temporal asymmetry. What would be problematic would be the claim that the
categorical constituents of the world were asymmetric on the micro scale. It has
sometimes been noted that this seems to be true of the standard interpretation of
quantum mechanics, according to which the wave function is localised after but
not before a measurement interaction.34 So much the worse for the standard
interpretation, in my view, but that’s an argument for another time. In the
present context the interesting thing is that any hidden variable theory which
fails to allow advanced action seems likely to violate this symmetry requirement.
To see why this is so, let us return to the photon case. The easiest way to
think about the difference between the advanced action interpretation and its
33Why? Simply because it would eliminate an otherwise mysterious breach of symmetry.
Reasoning of this kind is common in physics.
34See Penrose (1989), pp. 354-6, for example.
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orthodox rivals is in terms of counterfactuals assessed according to the “hold
fixed the accessible past” convention, which permit retro-dependency. (There is
no logical impropriety in discussing the case in these terms, so long as we keep
in mind that the objective content of the issue concerns patterns of correlation.)
The orthodox view is that the state φ of the photon between the polarisers does
not depend on the setting of the future polariser. If we assume that what is
accessible is the state of the photon in the region prior to the past polariser,
this independence assumption amounts to the following:
(5) With the history prior to the past polariser held fixed, changes in the
setting of the future polariser do not imply changes in the value of φ in
the region between the polarisers.
In order to determine whether this view involves a temporal asymmetry, we
need to ask whether it also endorses the temporal inverse of this assumption,
which is:
(6) With the course of events after the photon passes the future polariser held
fixed, changes in the setting of the past polariser do not imply changes in
the value of φ in the region between the polarisers.
There is little intuitive appeal in this latter proposition, however. The eas-
iest way to see this is to imagine more familiar cases in which we talk about
alternative histories. For example, suppose that we have an artefact, known to
be a year old, which could have been manufactured by one of two processes.
Given its present condition, does our view about its condition say six months
ago depend on our view about its origins? Obviously it might well do so. In the
one case, for example, the distinctive patina on the surface of the object might
have been a product of the manufacturing process itself; in the other case it
might have been acquired gradually as the object aged. So there is no reason to
expect the condition of the object in the intervening period to be independent
of what happened to it in the past.
In endorsing (5) but not (6), then, the orthodox view seems to be committed
to a genuine asymmetry—the sort of asymmetry which is not needed to account
for the contrast between (1) and (2). The advanced action view avoids this
asymmetry, by rejecting (5) as well as (6). This appears to be a powerful
additional argument in favour of the advanced action view. How could such an
argument have been overlooked? The answer, I take it, is that it has not been
noticed that the orthodox assumption involves anything more than the ordinary
asymmetry of physical dependency, exemplified by the contrast between (1)
and (2). Since the latter contrast is rightly assumed to involve no violation of
physical symmetry principles, it has been taken for granted that the same is
true in the cases of interest to quantum mechanics.
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12. Summary: the objective core of the advanced action interpretation.
Understanding the anthropocentric origins of the asymmetry of dependency is
thus an important step towards appreciating the attractions and physical sig-
nificance of an advanced action interpretation of quantum mechanics. On the
one hand it enables us to see that despite the conventional character of this
asymmetry, there is a real physical issue at stake. (Hence it counters the ten-
dency 35 to dismiss the approach as being either “metaphysical” or “subjective”,
and hence of no relevance to physics.) On the other hand, by unravelling some
the connections between our folk intuitions about causation and our place in
the physical world, it helps us to see that these intuitions do not provide an
authoritative guide to the issue in quantum mechanics.
In particular, the recognition of the subjectivity of causal asymmetry does
not throw the baby out with the bath water, as we put it earlier, leaving no
objective content to the advanced action view. The problem was simply that
we didn’t have a clear impression of the distinction between the water and the
baby—that is, between our subjectively-grounded intuitions concerning causal
asymmetry and an issue concerning patterns of correlation in the world. Once
the distinction has been drawn, however, it is possible with a little care to
discard the dirty water and keep the baby.
The baby is a proposition concerning the correlational structure of the mi-
croworld, and we have seen that there are two very different forms this structure
might take. There is an objective distinction between worlds which look as if
they contain unidirectional causation and worlds which look as if they contain
bidirectional causation (where “look as if” is to be filled out in terms of the con-
ventionalist’s account of how the temporally asymmetric nature of agents comes
to be reflected in their concept of causation). With the benefit of hindsight we
can see that we have never had good reason to exclude the structure that permits
interpretation in bidirectional terms. In order to be able to see this, however,
it was essential to appreciate the subjective character of the interpretation.36
13. TRIPLET SHOCK LATEST!
As some readers will already be aware, there is an interesting new class of Bell-
like results in quantum mechanics, which seem to achieve Bell’s conclusions by
non-statistical means. It is natural to wonder whether these new results—the
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) cases, as they have become known—have a
bearing on the arguments of this paper. To my knowledge, the GHZ argument
has not yet been expounded in non-technical terms in the general philosophi-
35Cf. note 25
36Compare: with hindsight we see that we really had no good reason to expect microphysical
objects to be coloured, but in order to appreciate that this is the case, we first had to appreciate
the subjective nature of colour concepts.
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cal literature.37 By a stroke of good fortune, however, it turns out that here
too Doppelga¨nger has been here first. In recently de-classified research,38 Dop-
pelga¨nger conducted further analyses of the Ypiarian police records, obtaining
results strikingly parallel to those predicted by GHZ. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to provide a brief exposition of these results, so as to show that the GHZ
results simply add weight to the existing case for advanced action.
Doppelga¨nger’s clandestine investigations led him from twins to triplets. To
his surprise, he found that the Ypiarian criminal code embodied special ex-
emptions for triplets, who were excused for adultery on grounds of diminished
childhood responsibility. When subject to random interrogation, then, triplets
were only asked one of the two questions Are you a thief? and Are you a mur-
derer? In records of these interrogations, Doppelga¨nger found that on occasions
on which all three members of a set of triplets were questioned in this way, their
answers always conformed to the following pattern:
same* When all three triplets were asked the first question, an odd number of
them said “no”.
diff* When two triplets were asked the second question and one the first, an
even number (i.e. two or none) of them said “no”.
As in the twins case, Doppelga¨nger asked himself whether these results could be
explained in terms of “local hidden variables”—that is, in terms of psychological
factors predisposing each triplet to respond in a certain way to either of the
possible questions, independently of the concurrent experiences of his or her
fellow triplets. Reasoning as follows, he decided that this was impossible.
Suppose that there are such psychological factors. Given a particular set of
triplets, let us write x1 and y1 for the factors responsible for the answer the first
triplet would give to the first and second question, respectively, and similarly x2,
y2, x3 and y3 for the corresponding factors in the second and third triplets. And
let us think of these factors as having values +1 or −1, according to whether
they dispose to a positive or negative answer. Then same* implies that the
product of x1, x2 and x3 is −1 (since it contains an odd number of negative
factors); and diff* implies that each of the products x1y2y3, y1x2y3 and y1y2x3
has value +1 (since it contains an even number of negative factors). Taken
together these results in turn imply that the combined product
(x1x2x3)(x1y2y3)(y1x2y3)(y1y2x3) = (−1)(+1)(+1)(+1) = −1.
This is impossible, however, since each individual factor occurs exactly twice on
the left hand side, so that negative factors must cancel out. Hence local hidden
variables cannot account for the observed results.
37The most accessible expositions are those of Mermin (1990) and Maudlin (1994), pp. 24-8.
My account draws on that of Clifton, Pagonis and Pitowsky (1992).
38Allegedly funded by the Copenhagen Interpretation Authority.
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Our present interest in this case lies in the fact that the triplet correlations
that Doppelga¨nger discovered in the Ypiarian case exactly match those pre-
dicted by the recent GHZ results in quantum mechanics. The behaviour of
Ypiarian triplets parallels that of sets of three spin-1/2 particles in the so-called
GHZ state, when subject to combinations of spin measurements in one of two
chosen directions orthogonal to their lines of flight. Particle 1 can thus have its
spin measured in direction x1 or direction y1, particle 2 in direction x2 or y2 and
particle 3 in direction x3 or y3. An argument exactly parallel to the one just
given shows that a local hidden variable theory cannot reproduce the predictions
of quantum mechanics concerning combinations of such measurements.
Notice that unlike Bell’s Theorem, the argument is combinatorial rather than
statistical in character. Like Bell’s Theorem, however, the GHZ argument de-
pends on the Independence Assumption. That is, it requires the assumption
that the values of hidden variables do not depend on what is to happen to the
particles in question in the future—in particular, on the settings of future spin
measurements. In the presentation of the argument by Clifton, Pagonis and
Pitowsky (1992) for example (whose terminology I have borrowed above, in de-
scribing the Ypiarian parallel), the assumption is introduced in the following
passage:
[W]e need to assume that λ [the set of hidden variables] is compatible with
all four measurement combinations. This will be so if: (a) the settings are
all fixed just before the measurement events occur, so that λ lies in the
backwards light-cones of the setting events, and (b) the choice of which
settings to fix is determined by (pseudo-)random number generators whose
causal history is sufficiently disentangled from λ. (1992, p. 117)
The advanced action interpretation will simply reject proposition (a), of cour-
se.39 In the present context the important point is that the GHZ argument
provides no new argument against the advanced action interpretation. On the
contrary, if anything, it simply adds impressive new weight to the view that the
alternatives to advanced action are metaphysically unpalatable.
14. Conclusion.
The metaphysical temptation that Bell noticed is a much better offer than he
himself took it to be. It doesn’t raise any new difficulties for free will, or any
awkward causal paradoxes. Its objective core seems to boil down to a rather
harmless proposal concerning the correlational structure of the microworld—
indeed, a proposal which seems independently attractive on symmetry grounds.
Yet it has the advantages that Bell seems to have recognised: it offers us a
route to an Einsteinian realism about quantum mechanics which is local, and
39Proposition (b) serves to exclude the alternative path to rejection of the Independence
Assumption which we mentioned in note 4.
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therefore compatible with special relativity; and which shares the well known
advantages of the Einsteinian view that quantum mechanics is incomplete. It is
time that this neglected approach received the attention it so richly deserves.40
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40A brief guide to further reading: the earliest, best known and certainly the most prolific
advocate of an advanced action interpretation is O. Costa de Beauregard, whose papers on
the topic date back to 1953. His more recent papers include (1977) and (1979). (Costa de
Beauregard’s views are discussed by d’Espagnat in the works mentioned in note 25.) The
most highly developed version of the interpretation seems to be that of J. G. Cramer (1986,
1988). In the former paper (pp. 684-5) Cramer compares his view to earlier advanced action
interpretations. The theoretical basis of Cramer’s approach seems to me to be questionable,
however: see my (1991b), pp. 973-4. Other advocates of advanced action in quantum mechan-
ics include Davidon (1976), Rietdijk (1978), Schulman (1986) and Sutherland (1983). See also
Price (1984).
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